UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
SCHEDULE 14A
(RULE 14a-101)
SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION
Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment
No. )
Filed by the
Registrant þ
Filed by a Party other than the
Registrant o
Check the appropriate box:
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o Preliminary
Proxy Statement
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o Confidential,
for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by
Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
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o Definitive
Proxy Statement
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þ Definitive
Additional Materials
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o Soliciting
Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12
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PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION
(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)
Not Applicable
(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if
other than the Registrant)
Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):
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þ |
No fee required.
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o |
Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act
Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.
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(1) |
Title of each class of securities to which
transaction applies:
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(2) |
Aggregate number of securities to which
transaction applies:
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(3) |
Per unit price or other underlying value of
transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11
(set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and
state how it was determined):
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(4) |
Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:
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o |
Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.
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o |
Check box if any part of the fee is offset as
provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing
for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the
previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or
Schedule and the date of its filing.
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(1) |
Amount Previously Paid:
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(2) |
Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
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Subject: Parker Hannifin Corp. Proxy Statement Supplemental Information
Dear Shareholder,
Parker Hannifin Corporations Annual Shareholders meeting is scheduled for October 25, 2006 and
your vote on this years proxy issues is very important to us.
The attached report recently issued by Proxy Governance Inc. provides information that may be
helpful to you in making an informed decision. Proxy Governance is an independent proxy research,
advisory and voting firm providing advice to institutional investors, pension plans, advisors,
money managers and others with the goal of building long-term shareholder value. It evaluates proxy
issues and makes voting recommendations on an issue-by-company basis, considering a companys
performance, compensation practices, management strength and other corporate governance factors.
I ask that you review this report and consider the issues addressed. I strongly believe Parkers
performance and the performance of the Board of Directors warrants your support with a vote against
the proposal to declassify the Board of Directors and votes for the Directors nominated for
re-election this year. If you would like to discuss these issues I would be happy to talk with you.
Most importantly, thank you for your continued interest in Parker. Were looking forward to another
outstanding year.
Sincerely,
Donald E. Washkewicz
Chairman & CEO
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PROXY Governance, Inc.
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Page 1 of 10 |
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Contact: Alesandra Monaco |
PROXY Governance, INC.
PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP (NYSE : PH)
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Annual Meeting
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Record Date: 08/31/2006 Meeting Date: 10/25/2006 |
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Classification: Fortune 500, Russell 3000, S&P 500
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Investor Relations |
Fiscal Year End: 06/30/2006
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Proxy Statement |
Market Capitalization: $9.3B
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SEC Filing 10k |
Solicitor: Georgeson Shareholder Communications
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Company Description |
Shareholder Proposal Deadline: 08/11/2007 |
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Meeting Agenda
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Recommendations |
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Proposals |
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Management |
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PROXY |
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Governance |
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MGT
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1
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Elect Nominees
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FOR
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FOR
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Analysis |
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1.1
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Robert J. Kohlhepp
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FOR
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FOR |
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1.2
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Giulio Mazzalupi
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FOR
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FOR |
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1.3
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Klaus-Peter Müller
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FOR
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FOR |
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1.4
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Markos I. Tambakeras
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FOR
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FOR |
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MGT
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2
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Ratify Appointment of Auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
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FOR
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FOR
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Analysis |
SH
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3
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Eliminate Classified Board
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AGAINST
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AGAINST
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Analysis |
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MGT = Management, SH=Shareholder, SHB=Shareholder binding proposal
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Table of Contents
Comparative Performance Analysis
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Peer Companies |
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Comparative Return to Shareholders |
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Composite Performance Summary |
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Performance Summary |
Governance Analysis
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Executive Compensation |
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Director Compensation |
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Board Profile |
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Stock Ownership/Voting Structure |
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State law/Charter/Bylaw Provisions |
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Auditor Profile |
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Vote Results |
Proposal Analysis
Comparative Performance Analysis
PROXY Governances Comparative Performance Analysis contains calculations and graphs that reflect a
companys historical performance and that of its industry peers (listed below) based on certain key financial metrics generally over a
five-year period.
Comparative Performance Analysis
Peer Companies
For the Comparative Performance Analysis, generally up to 10 peer companies are selected primarily
based on industry, but also considering market capitalization.
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Peer Companies |
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DANAHER CORP
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DOVER CORP
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EATON CORP
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HARSCO CORP |
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS
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INGERSOLL-RAND CO LTD
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ITT CORP
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METSO CORP -ADR |
PALL CORP
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PENTAIR INC |
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PROXY Governance, Inc.
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Page 2 of 10 |
Comparative Performance Analysis
Comparative Return to Shareholders
The graphs above depict total shareholder return and compounded annual growth rate at specific
points in time over the past five years based on
average monthly stock prices. The graphs should be read from left (present time) to right (60
months before present time). The graphs allow the
user to determine either the companys total shareholder return or compounded annual growth rate to
date based on an investment made at a
specific point in time over the last five years. Assumes payment, but not reinvestment, of
dividends.
Comparative Performance Analysis
Composite Performance Summary
Composite Performance:
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Percentile relative |
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Percentile |
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to S&P 1500 |
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Pts. |
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Company |
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Peers |
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Trend |
Composite: |
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54 |
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57 |
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Quarterly Shareholder Returns: |
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57 |
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60 |
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Cash Flow from Operations/Equity: |
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57 |
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54 |
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Return on Equity: |
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56 |
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63 |
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Revenue/Expenses: |
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35 |
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41 |
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á 1 |
Comparative Performance Analysis
Performance Summary
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PROXY Governance, Inc.
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Page 3 of 10 |
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PROXY Governance, Inc.
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Page 4 of 10 |
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PROXY Governance, Inc.
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Page 5 of 10 |
Governance Analysis
Governance Analysis
Executive Compensation
PROXY Governance evaluates a companys executive compensation over the last three years, as
available, and compares that to the median compensation paid by its peers over the same time frame.
For our compensation model, generally 20 peer companies are selected based on similarity of market
capitalization and broad economic sector using the GICS. Only U.S. and certain U.S. reporting
companies that are incorporated offshore are included in this peer group.
The graph that follows shows:
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The average three-year CEO compensation paid by the company expressed as a percentage from median peer compensation. |
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The average three-year compensation paid to the companys other named executives
(excluding the CEO) as a percentage from median peer compensation. |
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Domestic Peer Companies |
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AMERICAN STANDARD COS INC
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COOPER INDUSTRIES LTD
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CUMMINS INC
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DANAHER CORP |
DEERE & CO
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DOVER CORP
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EATON CORP
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FLUOR CORP |
GOODRICH CORP
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INGERSOLL-RAND CO LTD
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ITT CORP
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JOY GLOBAL INC |
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HLDGS INC
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PACCAR INC
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PALL CORP
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PRECISION CASTPARTS CORP |
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION
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ROCKWELL COLLINS INC
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SPX CORP
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TEXTRON INC |
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Executive Compensation |
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Salary |
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Bonus |
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Other Annual |
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Restricted |
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Stock |
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LTIP |
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All Other |
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1-yr Pay2 |
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Avg. Pay2 |
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Comp. |
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Stock |
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Options1 |
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Donald E. Washkewicz
Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman |
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$ |
1,100,000 |
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$ |
1,901,800 |
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$ |
271,264 |
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$ |
0 |
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$ |
3,730,770 |
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$ |
4,648,550 |
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$ |
15,402 |
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$ |
8,568,752 |
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$ |
7,712,179 |
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of the Board |
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John D. Myslenski
Executive Vice President-Sales, |
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631,000 |
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$ |
631,547 |
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$ |
184,798 |
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$ |
0 |
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$ |
2,312,782 |
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$ |
2,528,518 |
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$ |
15,012 |
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$ |
4,617,978 |
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$ |
3,964,276 |
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Marketing and Operations
Support |
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Timothy K. Pistell
Executive Vice
President-Finance and |
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$ |
589,000 |
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$ |
547,469 |
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$ |
213,992 |
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$ |
0 |
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$ |
1,271,032 |
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$ |
1,721,634 |
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$ |
12,664 |
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$ |
3,208,035 |
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$ |
2,689,113 |
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Administration and Chief
Financial
Officer |
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Robert P. Barker
Vice President and President,
Parker |
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$ |
400,000 |
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$ |
407,320 |
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$ |
109,238 |
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0 |
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$ |
494,075 |
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$ |
1,291,264 |
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$ |
17,000 |
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$ |
1,858,054 |
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$ |
1,913,504 |
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Aerospace Group |
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Nickolas W. Vande Steeg
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$ |
733,000 |
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962,123 |
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309,604 |
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325,050 |
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1,920,678 |
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$ |
2,700,946 |
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$ |
108,967 |
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$ |
5,192,525 |
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$ |
4,521,730 |
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President and Chief Operating
Officer |
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1 |
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Options valued using binomial formula. |
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Restricted stock is annualized over the year of the award and following three years;
LTIP is annualized over the year of the award and previous two years. Average pay is based on
three-years of pay data, when available. |
Source: Salary.com (www.executive.salary.com)
As disclosed for fiscal year end 2006.
Governance Analysis
Director
Compensation
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PROXY Governance, Inc.
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Page 6 of 10 |
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Board Member Compensation |
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Annual Fees |
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Initial Fees |
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Cash |
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Stock Awards / Units |
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Stock Options |
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Minimum Portion |
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Board Meeting Fee |
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# Board Meetings |
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Stock Awards / Units |
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Stock Options |
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($) |
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Paid In Stock |
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($) |
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$80,000 |
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-- |
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-- / 2,750 |
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-- |
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-- |
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5 |
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-- |
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-- / -- |
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Committee Compensation |
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Audit |
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Compensation |
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Nominating |
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# Meetings |
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Member |
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Chair |
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# Meetings |
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Member |
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# Meetings |
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Member |
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Chair |
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Fee |
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Retainer |
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Fee |
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Retainer |
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Fee |
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Retainer |
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Fee |
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Retainer |
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Fee |
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Retainer |
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8 |
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-- |
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-- |
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-- |
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15,000 |
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5 |
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-- |
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-- |
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$ |
5,000 |
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3 |
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-- |
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-- |
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$ |
5,000 |
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Governance Analysis
Board Profile
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Other |
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<75% |
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No |
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Prev. yr |
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Name |
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Nominee |
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Term |
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Not |
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Position |
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Audit |
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Comp. |
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Nom. |
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Age |
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Att. |
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stock |
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withhold |
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Ends |
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Ind. |
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Seats |
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votes |
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Presiding |
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William E. Kassling |
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o |
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2008 |
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o |
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Director |
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þ |
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o |
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Chair |
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62 |
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5 |
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1 |
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o |
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o |
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0.8 |
% |
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Chair, |
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Robert J. Kohlhepp |
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þ |
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2009 |
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o |
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o |
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Financial |
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o |
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o |
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62 |
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4 |
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2 |
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o |
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o |
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-- |
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Expert |
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Giulio Mazzalupi |
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þ |
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2009 |
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o |
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o |
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o |
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o |
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þ |
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65 |
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7 |
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-- |
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o |
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o |
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-- |
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Klaus-Peter Muller |
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þ |
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2009 |
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o |
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o |
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o |
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o |
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þ |
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62 |
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8 |
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1 |
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o |
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o |
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-- |
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Candy M. Obourn |
|
o |
|
|
2007 |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
o |
|
þ |
|
þ |
|
|
56 |
|
|
|
4 |
|
|
|
-- |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
-- |
|
Joseph M. Scaminace |
|
o |
|
|
2008 |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
o |
|
þ |
|
þ |
|
|
53 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
0.8 |
% |
Wolfgang R. Schmitt |
|
o |
|
|
2008 |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
þ |
|
Chair |
|
o |
|
|
62 |
|
|
|
14 |
|
|
|
-- |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
1.3 |
% |
Markos I. Tambakeras |
|
þ |
|
|
2009 |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
o |
|
þ |
|
o |
|
|
56 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
-- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
President, |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nickolas W. Vande Steeg |
|
o |
|
|
2007 |
|
|
þ |
|
COO |
|
o |
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
63 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
-- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Chair, |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Donald E. Washkewicz |
|
o |
|
|
2007 |
|
|
þ |
|
CEO |
|
o |
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
56 |
|
|
|
6 |
|
|
|
-- |
|
|
o |
|
o |
|
|
-- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Independence |
|
|
|
|
|
Board |
|
|
80.0 |
% |
Audit |
|
|
100.0 |
% |
Compensation |
|
|
100.0 |
% |
Nominating/Governance |
|
|
100.0 |
% |
PROXY Governance believes that the Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) standards of
independence are satisfactory and does not support the use of an additional overlay of independence
standards, which may vary among advisory services, institutional
investors, and commentators. PROXY
Governance believes that if the SROs standards are perceived to be inappropriate, interested
parties should reopen the debate with the SROs or the SEC to have those standards adjusted.
Governance Analysis
Stock Ownership/Voting Structure
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Type of stock |
|
Outstanding shares |
|
|
Vote(s) per share |
|
|
Common Stock |
|
|
119,738,081 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Director & Officer Ownership |
|
|
|
|
|
2.2 |
% |
|
|
|
|
|
Significant Shareholders |
|
|
|
|
|
Lord, Abbett & Co. LLC |
|
|
9.6 |
% |
Wellington Management Company, LLP |
|
|
7.6 |
% |
Barclays Global Investors, NA |
|
|
5.6 |
% |
Capital Research and Management Company |
|
|
5.1 |
% |
|
|
|
PROXY Governance, Inc.
|
|
Page 7 of 10 |
Governance Analysis
State Law/Charter/Bylaw Provisions
|
|
|
|
|
State Law Statutory Provisions |
|
|
|
|
|
State of incorporation |
|
Ohio |
Business combination |
|
þ |
Control share acquisition |
|
þ |
Fair price provision |
|
þ |
Constituency provision |
|
þ |
Poison pill endorsement |
|
þ |
|
|
|
|
|
Charter/Bylaws Provisions |
|
|
|
|
|
Classified board |
|
þ |
Cumulative voting |
|
þ |
Dual class/unequal voting rights |
|
o |
Blank check preferred stock |
|
þ |
Poison pill |
|
o |
Directors may be removed only for cause |
|
þ |
Only directors may fill board vacancies |
|
þ |
Only directors can change board size |
|
o |
Supermajority vote to remove directors |
|
o |
Prohibit shareholders to call special meetings |
|
o |
Prohibit action by written consent |
|
o |
Fair price provision |
|
þ |
Supermajority vote for mergers/business transactions |
|
þ |
Supermajority to amend charter/bylaw provisions |
|
þ |
Constituency provision |
|
o |
Governance Analysis
Auditor Profile
Peer group includes companies listed under Executive Compensation. |
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP has served as the companys independent auditors since 1938.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Audit Fees |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Audit fees |
|
|
Audit Related fees |
|
|
Tax fees |
|
|
Other fees |
|
|
Total fees paid |
|
|
PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP |
|
$ |
9,260,000 |
|
|
|
$423,127 |
|
|
$ |
2,390,000 |
|
|
$ |
0 |
|
|
$ |
12,073,127 |
|
As disclosed for fiscal year end 2006.
Governance Analysis
Vote Results of Last Annual Meeting
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Proposals |
|
|
|
% FOR Votes1 |
|
|
For Votes |
|
|
Against Votes |
|
|
Abstentions |
|
|
Broker Non-Votes |
|
|
MGT |
|
Elect directors2 |
|
|
98.7% - 99.2 |
% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MGT |
|
Ratify Appointment of Auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP |
|
|
97.7 |
% |
|
|
105,262,594 |
|
|
|
2,528,746 |
|
|
|
802,248 |
|
|
|
0 |
|
MGT |
|
Approve Parker-Hannifin Corporation Performance Bonus Plan |
|
|
94.9 |
% |
|
|
94,686,551 |
|
|
|
5,096,465 |
|
|
|
1,367,775 |
|
|
|
7,442,797 |
|
SH |
|
Eliminate Classified Board |
|
|
78.3 |
% |
|
|
77,842,086 |
|
|
|
21,633,982 |
|
|
|
1,674,723 |
|
|
|
7,442,797 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
As a % of votes cast for and against; may not reflect passage of proposal. |
|
2 |
|
Low High director votes. |
Note: See the Board Profile for individual director votes.
|
|
|
PROXY Governance, Inc.
|
|
Page 8 of 10 |
Proposal Analysis
Management
1 Elect Nominees
PROXY Governance Vote Recommendation: FOR
Proposal:
To elect the following four nominees to the board: R. Kohlhepp, G. Mazzalupi, K. Muller, M.
Tambakeras
The company has a staggered board.
Analysis:
|
|
|
Board size: 10 |
|
|
|
|
New directors since last year: 0 |
|
|
|
|
Independent directors: 8 |
|
|
|
|
Non-Independent directors: 2 |
Non-Independent directors: President/COO N. Vande Steeg, Chair/CEO D. Washkewicz
D. Collins, whose term expires in October 2006, and P. Likins, whose term expires in October 2008,
will both retire from the board effective as of Oct. 25, 2006 due to the policy of mandatory
retirement at age 70. H. Ortino, whose term was set to expire in October 2007, passed away in
November 2005.
Unless there is evidence of a breakdown in board monitoring or effectiveness such as poor
corporate performance relative to peers, excessive executive compensation, noncompliance with SEC
rules or SRO listing standards, a lack of responsiveness to legitimate shareholder concerns, or
various other factors we presume that the board is properly discharging its oversight role and
that it is adequately policing itself in terms of board organization, composition and functioning.
Performance: According to PROXY Governances performance
analysis, the company has performed in
line with peers over the past five years; the company ranks at the 53rd percentile relative to the
S&P 1500.
Compensation: The average three-year
compensation paid to the CEO is 48% above the median paid to
CEOs at peer companies and the average three-year compensation paid to the other named executives
is 72% above the median paid to executives at peer companies.
The companys executive compensation
appears somewhat high compared to peers and given its financial performance relative to peers,
which we attribute to the high value of stock options and restricted stock awarded to the companys other named executives.
The companys long-term incentive compensation for its executive
officers included both stock options and restricted stock awards. The restricted stock awarded to
an individual executive was based on a target stock incentive dollar value, which was established
by the Compensation Committee at the market median of comparable stock compensation for the
companys Compensation Comparison Group, a group of primarily Fortune 300 industrial
manufacturing companies. Individual payments were determined by comparing the companys revenue
growth, earnings per share, and return on invested capital to a group
of approximately 20 peers. For
example, President/COO Vande Steeg was awarded $2.7 million in restricted stock, and EVP J.
Myslenski was awarded $2.5 million in restricted stock.
The stock option grants were also based on a target value established at the Compensation
Comparison Groups market median of comparable stock incentive compensation. For example, Vande
Steeg was granted stock options valued at $1.9 million using a binomial formula, and Myslenski was
granted stock options valued at $2.3 million using a binomial formula. The options vest ratably
over three years following the grant date.
While the companys compensation to its other named executives is somewhat high compared to peers,
we note that company performance is generally in line, and that the long-term incentive awards are
based on comparable stock-based awards within the industry. We will continue to monitor executive
compensation.
Rationale/Conclusion:
PROXY Governance believes that the board is properly discharging its oversight role and adequately
policing itself. However, we will continue to monitor executive compensation going forward.
[back to top]
|
|
|
PROXY Governance, Inc.
|
|
Page 9 of 10 |
Management
2 Ratify Appointment of Auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
PROXY
Governance Vote Recommendation: FOR
Proposal:
The Audit Committee has selected PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the companys independent auditors
for the next fiscal year.
Analysis:
Barring circumstances where there is an audit failure due to the auditor not following its own
procedures or where the auditor is otherwise complicit in an accounting treatment that
misrepresents the financial condition of the company, PROXY Governance recommends the companys
choice of auditor. PROXY Governance believes that concerns about a corporations choice of auditor
and the services performed (e.g., high non-audit fees) should be directed through withhold votes
from the members of the audit committee, which is responsible for retaining and compensating the
auditor.
We note that PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP has served as the companys outside auditor since 1938.
Given this lengthy tenure, the Audit Committee report or charter should disclose the committees
policies and process for periodically evaluating the audit firm.
Rationale/Conclusion:
We believe that, in this circumstance, the board/audit committee should be accorded discretion in
its selection of the auditor.
[back to top]
Shareholder
3 Eliminate Classified Board
PROXY
Governance Vote Recommendation: AGAINST
Proposal:
The proponent requests that the board take the necessary steps to declassify the board so that all
directors are elected annually. Approval of this proposal will not automatically eliminate the
classified board structure since to do so would require an amendment of the companys governing
documents.
Proponent:
UNITE HERE
Shareholder View:
The proponent believes that shareholders should have the opportunity to vote on the performance of
the entire board each year and notes that institutional investors are calling for the end of
classified boards and many large companies are following this practice. The proponent also notes
last years vote result on the same issue.
Management View:
The company believes that it is in the best interests of shareholders to maintain the classified
board structure because it ensures the stability of continuous, experienced directors who have
specific knowledge of the company and the industry in which it operates, which helps to support
long-term corporate strategies. In addition, a classified board enhances its ability to negotiate
the best results for shareholders in a takeover situation since at least two annual meetings would
be required to effect a change in control of the board.
Analysis:
PROXY Governance generally believes that, in many situations, classified boards serve a very useful purpose and that they should not always be disparaged as simply another antitakeover device.
In some cases, a classified board can enhance director independence, and, at companies with
majority voting in director elections, a classified board safeguards against the possibility of all
directors failing an election at once.
We note that the arguments against classified boards
relating to their antitakeover effect are solely dependent on the classification being coupled
with a removal of directors only for cause provision. Absent such a provision there would be no
antitakeover effect. However, the ability to decouple board classification and removal for
cause only provisions varies from state to state. We believe, therefore, that much of the
motivation for these declassification proposals and rationale for them is misdirected at the
classified board concept, when it should be directed if the proponent is opposed to antitakeover
measures at the removal for cause concept.
Under the Ohio General Corporation Law, if a corporations board is divided into classes, then
directors may be removed by the shareholders only for cause.
We note
that the company has performed in line with peers over the past five years; the company
ranks at the 53rd percentile relative to the S&P 1500.
We also note that the board is 80% independent and that the average tenure on the board is 5
years.
We note that a shareholder proposal on this issue received support from 78.3% of the votes cast at
last years annual meeting.
Rationale/Conclusion:
We do not believe the classified board has been detrimental to shareholders and, in fact, can
provide benefits such as promoting independence and stability.
[back to top]
|
|
|
PROXY Governance, Inc.
|
|
Page 10 of 10 |
© 2006 by PROXY Governance, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The information contained in this
proxy analysis is confidential, for internal use only in accordance with the terms of the subscribers subscription agreement, and may not be reproduced or redistributed in any manner without
prior written consent from PROXY Governance, Inc. All information is provided as is and without
any warranty to accuracy, is not intended to solicit votes, and has not been submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission for approval. The information
should not be relied on for investment or other purposes.
Proponents and issuers written about in PROXY Governance research reports may be subscribers to
PROXY Governances proxy voting and/or research services. Although PROXY Governance often
confers with both proponents and issuers to ensure the accuracy of data, and to obtain an in-depth
understanding of matters and positions, neither proponents nor issuers are involved in the
preparation of the report or voting recommendations and PROXY Governance independently prepares
such reports and recommendations.